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Executive Summary 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a basis from which to start an informed and rational dialogue 
in Australia about voluntary euthanasia (VE) and assisted suicide (AS).  It does this by seeking to 
chart the broad landscape of issues that can be raised as relevant to how this conduct should be 
regulated by the law.  It is not our purpose to persuade. Rather, we have attempted to address the 
issues as neutrally as possible and to canvass both sides of the argument in an even-handed manner.  
We hope that this exercise places the reader in a position to consider the question posed by this 
paper: 
 
 
How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide? 
 
 
In line with the approach taken in the paper, this question does not take sides in the debate.  It 
simply asks how VE and AS should be regulated, acknowledging that both prohibition and 
legalisation of such conduct involve regulation. 
 
We begin by considering the wider legal framework that governs end of life decision-making.  
Decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment that result in a person’s death can be 
lawful.  This could be because, for example, a competent adult refuses such treatment.  
Alternatively, stopping or not providing treatment can be lawful when it is no longer in a person’s 
best interests to receive it.  The law also recognises that appropriate palliative care should not 
attract criminal responsibility.  By contrast, VE and AS are unlawful in Australia and could lead to 
prosecution for crimes such as murder, manslaughter or aiding and abetting suicide.  But this is not 
to say that such conduct does not occur in practice. Indeed, there is a body of evidence that VE and 
AS occur in Australia, despite them being unlawful. 
 
There have been repeated efforts to change the law in this country, mainly by the minor political 
parties.  However, apart from a brief period when VE and AS was lawful in the Northern Territory, 
these attempts to reform the law have been unsuccessful.  The position is different in a small but 
increasing number of jurisdictions overseas where such conduct is lawful.  The most well known is 
the Netherlands but there are also statutory regimes that regulate VE and/or AS in Belgium and 
Luxembourg in Europe, and Oregon and Washington in the United States.  A feature of these 
legislative models is that they incorporate review or oversight processes that enable the collection of 
data about how the law is being used.  As a result, there is a significant body of evidence that is 
available for consideration to assess the operation of the law in these jurisdictions and some of this 
is considered briefly here.  Assisting a suicide, if done for selfless motives, is also legal in Switzerland, 
and this has resulted in what has been referred to as ‘euthanasia tourism’.  This model is also 
considered. 
 
The paper also identifies the major arguments in favour of, and against, legalisation of VE and AS.  
Arguments often advanced in favour of law reform include respect for autonomy, that public opinion 
favours reform, and that the current law is incoherent and discriminatory.  Key arguments against 
legalising VE and AS point to the sanctity of life, concerns about the adequacy and effectiveness of 
safeguards, and a ‘slippery slope’ that will allow euthanasia to occur for minors or for adults where it 
is not voluntary.  We have also attempted to step beyond these well trodden and often rehearsed 
cases ‘for and against’. To this end, we have identified some ethical values that might span both 
sides of the debate and perhaps be the subject of wider consensus.  
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We then outline a framework for considering the issue of how Australia should regulate VE and AS.  
We begin by asking whether such conduct should be criminal acts (as they presently are). If VE and 
AS should continue to attract criminal responsibility, the next step is to enquire whether the law 
should punish such conduct more or less than is presently the case, or whether the law should stay 
the same.  If a change is favoured as to how the criminal law punishes VE and AS, options considered 
include sentencing reform, creating context-specific offences or developing prosecutorial guidelines 
for how the criminal justice system deals with these issues. 
 
If VE and AS should not be criminal acts, then questions arise as to how and when they should be 
permitted and regulated.  Possible elements of any reform model include: ensuring decision-making 
is competent and voluntary; ascertaining a person’s eligibility to utilise the regime, for example, 
whether it depends on him or her having a terminal illness or experiencing pain and suffering; and 
setting out processes for how any decision must be made and evidenced.  Options to bring about 
decriminalisation include challenging the validity of laws that make VE and AS unlawful, recognising 
a defence to criminal prosecution, or creating a statutory framework to regulate the practice. 
 
We conclude the paper where we started: with a call for rational and informed consideration of a 
difficult and sensitive issue.  How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted 
suicide? 
 
  
1. Introduction  
 
Voluntary euthanasia (VE) and assisted suicide (AS) are important yet ethically challenging issues in 
contemporary Australian society.  They are issues about which public opinion tends to be polarised 
as individuals can and do have thoroughly researched and considered, yet different positions.  The 
stakes in this debate are also very high. Those against legalising VE and AS argue that it represents 
societal endorsement of the intentional ending of another person’s life while those in favour argue 
reform is necessary for people to be able to choose to die with dignity.  Agitation for law reform has 
been an ongoing phenomenon in this debate.  While reform is occurring in an increasing number of 
overseas jurisdictions, attempts to reform the law in Australia have been unsuccessful to date.1  This 
is despite a large number of bills being put forward over a sustained period of time, with legislative 
efforts occurring in every Australian State and Territory except for Queensland.2  There is no 
indication that such attempts will cease.  At the time of writing this paper, there are plans for bills 
dealing with the issue of euthanasia to be introduced into the New South Wales3 and Tasmanian4 
Parliaments.  Questions about how the law regulates these issues have also been raised by the 
criminal prosecution of individuals who have ended the lives of others or assisted others to end their 
own lives.5  
 
The issue of how we, as a society, regulate VE and AS arises in a particular social, demographic and 
medical context.  For example, Australia has an ageing population and the baby boomer generation 
is now (and will increasingly be) involved in medical decisions as they come to the end of their lives.  
This generation will not be passive recipients of paternalistic medical practices, and will insist on 
greater input in and control over their dying process. At the same time, VE and AS are issues that are 
of significant interest to the public and, as considered in this paper, are issues about which there is 
majority public support for reform.6  Further, this debate occurs in the context of ongoing advances 
in medicine.  Lives can be sustained in circumstances that have never previously been contemplated, 
and decisions need to be made about whether to give life-sustaining medical treatment, or allow the 
                                                          
1
 Note, however, the Northern Territory legislation, Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995, which operated until 
its repeal by the Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth).  
2
 See, for example, Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2012 (SA); Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2011 (NSW); Criminal 
Law Consolidation (Medical Defences—End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011 (SA);  Voluntary 
Euthanasia Bill 2010 (SA); Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care (End of Life Arrangements) 
Amendment Bill 2010 (SA); Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 (WA).  For further discussion, see below in Section 4 
Legislative reform attempts in Australia. 
3
  In the New South Wales Legislative Council on 23 October, Cate Faehrmann (Australian Greens) signalled the 
introduction of the Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill into Parliament in 2013. 
4
 According to media reports, a voluntary euthanasia bill will be introduced by Lara Giddings (Tasmanian 
Premier) and Nick McKim (leader of the Australian Greens in Tasmania) into Tasmanian Parliament this year: D 
Arndt, ‘Assisted death debate reignited’, The Examiner, 4 July 2012. 
5
 Recent prosecutions that have attracted attention include those of Shirley Justins and Caren Jenning (Justins 
v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 242; R v Justins *2011+ NSWSC 568); David Mathers (‘Mercy killer escapes jail over 
“agonising conflict”’, Sydney Morning Herald, 28 April 2011, available at: http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/mercy-
killer-escapes-jail-over-agonising-conflict-20110428-1dxst.html (accessed 16 August 2012)); Victor Rijn 
(‘Husband's suicide push driven “by love”’, The Age, 23 May 2011, available at: 
http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/husbands-suicide-push-driven-by-love-20110523-1f00m.html (accessed 
16 August 2012)); and Merin Nielsen (R v Nielsen *2012+ QSC 29; Brooke Baskin, ‘Queensland teacher Merin 
Nielsen jailed for aiding suicide of man, 76’, The Courier Mail, 17 February 2012, available at: 
http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/familys-despair-at-suicide-jailing/story-e6freoof-
1226273271906 (accessed 16 August 2012)). 
6
 See below in Section 6.2 Key arguments in favour of legalising VS and AS: ‘Public opinion is in favour of 
legalising VE and AS’. 
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individual to die.  There have also been significant improvements in palliative care which have 
enabled pain in dying patients to be managed to the extent that has not been possible in the past. 
 
Australia21 wishes to advance the debate on VE and AS in an evidence-based and rational way. This 
paper is the first step in that process and addresses the question: 
 
 
How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide? 
 
 
The above question does not imply a view as to whether the existing law should remain the same, or 
be amended.  VE and AS are currently regulated (by the criminal law) and would also be the subject 
of regulation (in varying ways) under proposals to legalise these practices. 
 
 
2. Definitions and scope of paper 
 
It is important to be clear about the meaning of the terms used in this paper and the scope of issues 
it is considering.  A failure to define terms and articulate clearly the issues being discussed can lead 
to confusion through people talking at cross-purposes as well as generating conflict where in fact 
none exists.  In this paper, we adopt the following definitions. 
 
Table 1: Terminology used in the paper 
 
Term Meaning Example 
euthanasia For the purpose of relieving suffering, 
a person performs an action with the 
intention of ending the life of another 
person 
A doctor injects a patient with a lethal 
substance to relieve that person from 
unbearable physical pain 
voluntary 
euthanasia 
Euthanasia is performed at the 
request of the person whose life is 
ended, and that person is competent 
A doctor injects a competent patient, 
at their request, with a lethal 
substance to relieve that person from 
unbearable physical pain 
competent A person is competent if he or she is 
able to understand the nature and 
consequences of a decision, and can 
retain, believe, evaluate, and weigh 
relevant information in making that 
decision 
 
non-voluntary 
euthanasia 
Euthanasia is performed and the 
person is not competent 
A doctor injects a patient in a post-
coma unresponsive state (sometimes 
referred to as a persistent vegetative 
state) with a lethal substance 
involuntary 
euthanasia 
Euthanasia is performed and the 
person is competent but has not 
expressed the wish to die or has 
expressed a wish that he or she not 
die 
A doctor injects a competent patient 
who is in the terminal stage of a 
terminal illness such as cancer with a 
lethal substance without that person’s 
request 
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Term Meaning Example 
withholding or 
withdrawing life-
sustaining 
treatment7 
Treatment that is necessary to keep a 
person alive is not provided or is 
stopped 
Withdrawing treatment: A patient with 
profound brain damage as a result of a 
heart attack is in intensive care and 
breathing with the assistance of a 
ventilator, and a decision is made to 
take him or her off the ventilator 
because there is no prospect of 
recovery  
 
Withholding treatment: A decision is 
made not to provide nutrition and 
hydration artificially (such as through a 
tube inserted into the stomach) to a 
person with advanced dementia who is 
no longer able to take food or 
hydration orally  
 
assisted suicide A competent person dies after being 
provided by another with the means 
or knowledge to kill him- or herself 
A friend or relative obtains a lethal 
substance (such as Nembutal) and 
provides it to another to take 
physician-
assisted suicide 
Assisted suicide where a doctor acts as 
the assistant 
A doctor provides a person with a 
prescription to obtain a lethal dose of a 
substance 
 
We also clarify the scope of this paper.  It will consider only the arguments that relate to VE and AS, 
which deal only with requests from a competent adult for death or assistance to die.  There are two 
main reasons for limiting the paper in this way.  Firstly, different (and possibly even more ethically 
problematic) issues arise where the person is competent and does not request euthanasia, is 
incompetent so unable to express a view, or is a minor.  Secondly, all of the attempts to reform the 
law in Australia have been limited to VE and AS, as has the vast majority of public debate.  
Accordingly, although some may argue that euthanasia and AS should extend to other situations, 
such issues are not explored here.  As such, this paper will not consider euthanasia and AS for: 
 
 Adults who are competent and do not want to end their lives; 
 Adults who were competent at some point and completed an advance directive requesting 
euthanasia or assistance to die at a later time when he or she has lost competence; 
 Individuals who are not competent (adults or minors) and therefore unable to make an 
informed choice about whether to end their lives; and 
 Competent minors who seek euthanasia or assistance to die. 
 
  
                                                          
7
 This is sometimes referred to as ‘passive euthanasia’ as the death arises from not giving life-sustaining 
treatment. 
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3. Current Australian legal landscape at the end of life 
 
3.1 VE and AS are unlawful 
 
VE and AS are unlawful in all States and Territories in Australia.8  Ending another person’s life is 
murder or manslaughter under the criminal law. Assisting a person to end their own life is also a 
criminal offence and is described in different jurisdictions in terms such as aiding and abetting 
suicide.9  (It is not unlawful, however, for a person to end, or attempt to end, their own life.) A 
person will still be criminally responsible for his or her actions even if he or she is motivated by 
compassion or if the deceased consented to his or her own death.10   
 
3.2 Withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment can be lawful 
 
While taking active steps to end a person’s life (or assisting them to do so themselves) is unlawful, 
the law does permit life-sustaining treatment to be withheld or withdrawn in certain 
circumstances.11  One situation is where a person who is competent to make his or her own 
decisions refuses that treatment.  This right to refuse medical treatment is underpinned by respect 
for bodily integrity.  The law protects a person from interference with their body – including by way 
of medical treatment – unless there is some recognised legal justification for doing so. A person’s 
decision to not receive treatment must be respected even if that treatment is necessary to stay alive 
and even if the refusal of treatment is contrary to medical opinion.12 
 
Decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment can also be made by and for a person 
who lacks decision-making competence.  One way this can be done is through an advance directive.  
This is where a person makes decisions while they are competent about what medical treatment 
they want or do not want when they lose their ability to decide for themselves.  Most Australian 
jurisdictions have enshrined this common law right into legislation.13  A second way to make 
decisions when a person lacks competence is through substitute decision-making.  Adult 
guardianship legislation throughout Australia establishes mechanisms for people (generally those 
close to the patient) to be empowered to make decisions about health care when a patient cannot 
decide for themselves.14  The criteria substitute decision-makers need to consider when making 
decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment vary across Australia but the patient’s 
best interests is generally an integral factor.15  Thirdly, parents can make this decision for their 
                                                          
8
 See generally C Stewart, ‘Euthanasia and assisted suicide’ in B White, F McDonald and L Willmott (eds), 
Health Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2010) [12.10]-[12.200]. 
9
 B Murphy, ‘Human Rights, human dignity and the right to die: Lessons from Europe of assisted suicide’ (2009) 
33 Criminal Law Journal 341, 347-8. 
10
 M Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Clarendon Press, 1997) 21-2.  
11
 See generally L Willmott, B White and S-N Then, ‘Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical 
Treatment’ in B White, F McDonald and L Willmott (eds), Health Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2010). 
12
 L Willmott, B White and S-N Then, ‘Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment’ in B 
White, F McDonald and L Willmott (eds), Health Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2010) [13.30]-[13.40]. 
13
 L Willmott, ‘Advance Directives and the Promotion of Autonomy: a Comparative Australian Statutory 
Analysis’ (2010) 17 Journal of Law and Medicine 556.  
14
 See generally B White, L Willmott and S-N Then, ‘Adults who Lack Capacity: Substitute Decision-Making’ in B 
White, F McDonald and L Willmott (eds), Health Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2010). 
15
 L Willmott, B White and S-N Then, ‘Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment’ in B 
White, F McDonald and L Willmott (eds), Health Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2010) [13.130], [13.180]-
[13.230]. 
10 
 
children who do not yet have decision-making competence.  The relevant criterion for such a 
decision is the child’s best interests.16 
 
In addition to patients, substitute decision-makers and parents being able to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment in certain circumstances, it is also possible for doctors to make this decision to withhold 
or withdraw treatment.  The law generally does not impose a duty on doctors to provide treatment 
that will not benefit a patient.  Where a doctor determines that treatment is not in a patient’s best 
interests, he or she is not required to provide it even if it is needed for the patient to stay alive.17  
Sometimes this decision is framed in terms of treatment being ‘futile’. 
 
Although the person dies both when life-sustaining treatment is withheld or withdrawn and when VE 
occurs, the law distinguishes between them.  Withholding and withdrawing is lawful because it 
involves a failure to treat where there is no duty to provide that treatment.  The absence of a duty is 
due either to the refusal of treatment by the patient or his or her substitute decision-maker, or 
because the treatment is not in the patient’s best interests and so need not be provided. By 
contrast, VE involves taking active steps to end another’s life and so is in breach of the criminal law. 
 
3.3 Provision of appropriate palliative care is lawful 
 
Australian law is also very likely to recognise that the provision of appropriate palliative care is 
lawful, even if it might hasten death.18  This is despite the fact that providing this treatment could be 
seen as taking active steps to end a patient’s life and therefore be in breach of the criminal law.  This 
legal protection arose in response to concerns that otherwise appropriate palliative care could 
accelerate death (for example, opioids suppressing respiration) although many argue that properly 
administered palliative care does not do this.19 
 
Of greatest significance for Australian law is a health professional’s intention.  To be lawful, palliative 
care must be provided with the intention to relieve pain and not to cause or hasten death, although 
that death may be foreseen.  In the three States that have enshrined this protection in statute, 
regard must also be had to other factors such as good medical practice.20   
 
The central role of intention raises questions for how the law operates in this area.  A doctor’s 
intentions when providing certain treatment are easy to obscure or can be ambiguous.  It is possible 
for the same act to be done, namely hastening a patient’s death, with different intentions.  For 
example, a doctor may provide medication with the intention of hastening death, or instead with the 
intention of relieving pain and only foreseeing (rather than intending) the likely death.21  While the 
statement of law may be clear, its operation in practice is not.22  
                                                          
16
 L Willmott, B White and S-N Then, ‘Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment’ in B 
White, F McDonald and L Willmott (eds), Health Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2010) [13.280]-[13.290]. 
17
 L Willmott, B White and S-N Then, ‘Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment’ in B 
White, F McDonald and L Willmott (eds), Health Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2010) [13.70]-[13.80]. 
18
 See generally B White and L Willmott, ‘The Doctrine of Double Effect’ in B White, F McDonald and L Willmott 
(eds), Health Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2010). 
19
 B White, L Willmott and M Ashby, ‘Palliative care, double effect and the law in Australia’ (2011) 41 Internal 
Medicine Journal 485. 
20
 B White, L Willmott and M Ashby, ‘Palliative care, double effect and the law in Australia’ (2011) 41 Internal 
Medicine Journal 485. 
21
 CD Douglas, IH Kerridge and R Ankeny, ‘Managing intentions: the end-of-life administration of analgesics and 
sedatives, and the possibility of slow euthanasia’ (2008) 22 Bioethics 388. 
22
 See below in Section 6.2 Key arguments in favour of legalising VE and AS: ‘Current regulatory framework 
does not work: VE and AS currently occurs’. 
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4. Legislative reform attempts in Australia  
 
Australia has witnessed continual and numerous attempts to reform the law governing VE and AS. 
These attempts have occurred in all Australian States and Territories except Queensland.  In the 
past, most bills have been introduced by members of the Australian Greens, Australian Democrats 
and Independent members, although some recent attempts since 2010 have come from an ALP 
member of parliament. In the table that appears as Appendix A to this Paper, we have listed 
legislative attempts to reform the law regarding VE and/or AS of which we are aware, along with 
details of who introduced the bill and when, and in which house of parliament this occurred.  While 
the vast majority of these bills sought to effect change in the substantive law governing VE and AS, 
there were also bills dealing with other issues in this area such as seeking a referendum on the topic 
and restoring the powers of Territories to legislate on the issue. 
 
The history of failed attempts at legislative reform suggests that despite strong public opinion in 
favour of VE and AS, there is not majority support from politicians as a group for changing the law.  
Understanding politicians’ perspectives and motivations for this position is important but there is 
only limited empirical evidence as to politicians’ role in this debate.  One study examined how 
federal politicians voted in a conscience vote to overturn the Northern Territory euthanasia 
legislation (and two other sensitive conscience votes).23  Three key factors that were significant in 
how the politicians voted were party alliances, gender and religious affiliation.24 The most significant 
correlation was religious affiliation, with all Catholics voting in favour of overturning the Northern 
Territory legislation and all but one of the politicians from other Christian religions doing the same.  
Another study surveyed Queensland politicians as to their personal views on these issues and found 
that 55% of respondents favoured euthanasia reform.25  However, the study suggested that these 
personal views may not be followed in a public vote where concerns about party lines and re-
election intrude.  
 
Given the critical role that politicians play in this debate and the apparent disconnect between public 
opinion and politicians’ opinions, it may be instructive to analyse the public record (for example, 
hansard and the reports of review committees) to distil the arguments that politicians identify as 
important when supporting or opposing reform.  Such an analysis may be helpful in better 
understanding the VE and AS debate, particularly if politicians are granted a conscience vote as is 
often the case for topics such as these. 
 
5. Legislative schemes that permit VE and/or AS 
 
Although reform has not occurred in Australia (except for a brief period in the Northern Territory), 
legislation permits VE and/or AS in the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Oregon, Washington and 
Switzerland.  In the first five jurisdictions (Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Oregon and 
Washington), reform occurred through specific legislation.  In Switzerland, AS is permitted in some 
circumstances because of the narrower reach of the crime of AS in that country, and this is explained 
further below.  In this section, we will provide a brief overview of the legislative models that 
currently operate, as well as the legislation that was enacted and operated (albeit briefly) in the 
                                                          
23
 J Warhurst, ‘Conscience Voting in the Australian Federal Parliament’ (2008) 54 Australian Journal of Politics 
and History 579. 
24
 Religious affiliation was included where the relevant politician had identified his or her affiliation and where 
this information was in the public domain. 
25
 L Willmott and B White, ‘Private Thoughts of Public Representatives: Assisted Death, Voluntary Euthanasia 
and Politicians’ (2003) 11 Journal of Law and Medicine 77. 
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Northern Territory prior to its repeal by the Commonwealth Parliament.  As our focus here is on the 
more detailed regulation that occurs through legislative reform, we will not examine where reform 
has occurred through judicial means (for example in Montana), although this is considered later in 
the paper.26 
  
5.1 Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Oregon, Washington (and the Northern 
Territory) 
 
The statutes enacted in these jurisdictions are set out in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: VE and AS legislation by jurisdiction 
 
Jurisdiction Legislation 
Netherlands27 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act 2000 
Belgium Act on Euthanasia 2002 
Luxembourg Law of 16 March 2009 on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide 
Oregon28 Death with Dignity Act 1994  
Washington29 Washington Death with Dignity Act 
Northern Territory Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 (now repealed) 
 
The table that appears as Appendix B to this paper provides some further detail about aspects of the 
above six statutes and facilitates comparisons across jurisdictions. We also make some observations 
here about key features of these legislative regimes.  Firstly, the statutes differ in relation to the kind 
of activity which is regulated – either VE or AS or both.  VE and AS are permitted in the Netherlands, 
Belgium30 and Luxembourg, and were permitted under the Northern Territory regime.  Only assisting 
a suicide can be lawful in Oregon and Washington.   
 
Secondly, there is significant divergence in terms of eligibility requirements, that is, what must be 
present before a person will qualify for VE or AS under the particular regime.  Such requirements 
relate to the person’s competence, age, medical condition as well as whether there are any 
residence requirements that must be satisfied.   In Oregon and Washington (and the Northern 
Territory), the person must be competent at the time he or she is making the request to end his or 
her life, while in the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, a person’s advance statement 
                                                          
26
 See below in Section 8 A framework for considering regulatory options for VE and AS.  We note too that 
judicial reform also occurred in Colombia in 1997, although a recent media article has reported that a bill has 
been passed in Colombia that regulates the practice of euthanasia in some circumstances: J O’Gorman, 
‘Colombian Senate Approves Regulation of Euthanasia’, Colombia Reports, 9 August 2012, available at: 
http://www.colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/25483-colombian-senate-approves-regulation-of-
euthanasia.html (accessed 17 August 2012). 
27
 Note that prior to legislative reform in the Netherlands, case law in that country had recognised the defence 
of necessity for a doctor in some cases where he or she was confronted with a request by a patient to die, and 
providing assistance was the only way to end the patient’s suffering.   
28
 In Oregon, the legislation resulted from a voter-initiated referendum.  For a discussion of the legal 
challenges to this legislation, see C Stewart, ‘Euthanasia and assisted suicide’ in B White, F McDonald and L 
Willmott (eds), Health Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2010) [12.210]. 
29
 The Washington legislation was also enacted as a result of a referendum at the 2008 general election. 
30
 It should be noted that the Belgian legislation does not expressly permit AS.  However, there appears to be 
general acceptance, including by the Federal Control and Evaluation Commission, the body established to 
oversee the implementation of the euthanasia law, that provided the safeguards of the euthanasia legislation 
are complied with, a doctor who assisted a suicide would also be protected by the legislation: G Lewy, Assisted 
Death in Europe and America, Four Regimes and Their Lessons (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2011) 77 (accessed 
20 August 2012). 
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requesting euthanasia can also be acted upon.  In most jurisdictions (Luxembourg, Oregon, 
Washington and the Northern Territory), there is a requirement that the person be suffering from a 
terminal illness.  Although there is no such requirement in the Netherlands or Belgium, in those 
jurisdictions, the person’s suffering must be ‘lasting and unbearable’ (Netherlands) or the person 
must be in a medically futile condition of constant and unbearable physical or mental suffering that 
cannot be alleviated (Belgium).  In most jurisdictions, the person must be an adult, although the 
Belgian legislation extends to ‘emancipated minors’ and in the Netherlands, such practices can occur 
for minors as young as 12.31  The legislation in Oregon and Washington contain residence 
requirements, but that is not the case in the other jurisdictions (and was not the case for the 
Northern Territory regime).  
 
All statutes contain safeguards although there are significant variations between jurisdictions.  These 
safeguards include ensuring that the consent of the person was given voluntarily, requiring 
information to be provided to the person, involving more than one doctor, and observing cooling off 
periods between making the initial request for assistance and the person dying.  Details of the 
safeguards in the various jurisdictions are contained in Appendix B.    
 
Finally, all statutes have provisions facilitating oversight of the practice of VE and/or AS. 
 
5.2 Switzerland 
 
Over recent years, Switzerland has become a destination for individuals who come from jurisdictions 
in which VE and AS is unlawful, but who want assistance to end their lives.  Ironically, Switzerland 
has not passed legislation to make either VE or AS lawful.  The law in Switzerland is governed by 
their Criminal Code, and under that Code, both VE and AS are unlawful.  The relevant provisions are 
set out below:32 
 
Article 114 
Any person who for commendable motives, and in particular out of compassion for the 
victim, causes the death of a person at that person’s own genuine and insistent request shall 
be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. 
 
Article 115 
Any person who for selfish motives incites or assists another to commit or attempt to 
commit suicide shall, if that other person thereafter commits or attempts to commit suicide, 
be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty. 
 
Article 114 deals with VE as it involves a person who ‘causes’ the death of another, while article 115 
is about assisting another to bring about his or her own death.  The effect of article 114 is that VE is 
unlawful and the person performing the act commits a crime, even if the act is done for 
‘commendable motives’ at the other’s request.  On the other hand, not all cases of AS will be illegal.  
Assisting a suicide is only an offence if it is done for ‘selfish’ motives.  Article 115 is unlikely to apply 
to a case where a person has a medical condition which causes unbearable pain and suffering, forms 
a desire to end his or her life to relieve that pain and suffering, and seeks assistance to achieve that 
goal. 
                                                          
31 Euthanasia can be performed at a minor’s request if the minor is aged between 16 and 18, the minor has a 
reasonable understanding of his or her own interests, and the parents or guardians have been involved in the 
decision-making process.  This is also the case for a minor aged between 12 and 16 who has a reasonable 
understanding of his or her own interests, and where the parents or guardians agree with the decision. 
32
 http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/3/311.0.en.pdf (accessed 20 July 2012).  This source is an English translation 
of the Swiss Criminal Code, and is not an official source. 
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There are a number of consequences that flow from the fact that the permissive Swiss law arose 
from the interpretation given to an offence provision in its Criminal Code, rather than a 
comprehensive statutory regime designed to regulate AS.  Most significantly, there are no express 
eligibility criteria to be satisfied for the person seeking assistance to die, and few safeguards.  
Provided the person assisting another to die is not motivated by selfish motives, an offence has not 
been committed.  It also means that assistance can be provided by friends and relatives, and is not 
limited to doctors as in the other jurisdictions.  Further, again unlike the other jurisdictions, this also 
means there is less governmental oversight in terms of the practices which are occurring. The 
absence of a regulatory regime also means that there is not scope to impose a residence 
requirement as in Oregon and Washington.  Because providing assistance is lawful if it is done with 
selfless motives, this test can be met both when assisting Swiss residents to die and those who visit 
Switzerland specifically seeking this assistance.33 
 
 
6. Arguments for and against reform  
 
This section considers briefly the arguments that are generally espoused to support or oppose 
legalising VE and AS.  There is not scope in this paper to exhaustively summarise the vast literature in 
this field, or to outline the nuances that are relevant to each argument.  Nevertheless, we examine 
briefly the critical issues that are important to the different perspectives in the debate. 
 
6.1 Finding a consensus of ethical values  
 
Before rehearsing the arguments for and against VE and AS, we will attempt to identify some ethical 
or moral positions about which consensus as to their relevance to this debate may be possible.  This 
exercise is undertaken in the hope that agreement about these positions may provide a touchstone 
in discussions about whether or not the current regulatory environment should remain or, if reform 
is proposed, the nature of such reform.   
 
1. The inherent value of human life: There is general, although not universal, consensus that 
special status should be afforded to human beings over and above other species.   
 
2. The need to respect a person’s autonomy: The right of a competent person to self-
determination is a fundamental principle in a liberal democracy, and should be respected.34 
 
3. The need to protect vulnerable members of society:  As a society, we value all individuals and 
want to protect those who are vulnerable and in need of protection. 
 
4. The need to alleviate pain and suffering from individuals who are unwell: As a compassionate 
society, we seek to minimise or completely ameliorate pain or suffering endured by individuals 
who are unwell. 
 
                                                          
33
 Since 2003, Dignitas states that it has assisted 15 Australians to end their lives in Switzerland: Dignitas, 
‘Accompaniments to suicide per year and residence’, available at: 
http://www.dignitas.ch/images/stories/pdf/statistik-ftb-jahr-wohnsitz-1998-2011.pdf (accessed 17 August 
2012). 
34
 The authors acknowledge that differing views exist about what constitutes autonomy for the purpose of 
medical decision-making, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore those contrasting views. 
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5. The need for the law to be coherent and transparent: For a liberal democracy to function 
effectively, individuals should respect the prevailing legal framework.  For this to occur, the law 
must be coherent, and operate in a transparent fashion. 
 
6. The need for the law to be followed:  For a liberal democracy to function effectively, individuals 
need to follow the law. 
 
As mentioned above, the goal in attempting to articulate ethical principles that are shared by the 
majority of the community, is to identify points of possible consensus for all individuals regardless of 
their perspective in the euthanasia debate.  We acknowledge, however, that despite the potential 
for agreement on some core ethical principles, the different weight afforded to these principles by 
individuals may, and probably will, lead to different conclusions in terms of desired regulatory 
models. 
 
6.2 Key arguments in favour of legalising VE and AS 
 
1. Autonomy (sometimes referred to as the right to self-determination) demands that a 
competent person has the right to choose how he or she dies 
 
The right of a competent person to make decisions that affect his or her own life is seen as 
fundamental in a liberal democracy such as Australia.  This is sometimes referred to as a right to self-
determination or a right to act in an autonomous way.  This right of self-determination should entitle 
a competent person who is informed of his or her medical diagnosis, prognosis, treatment options 
and consequences of those options to choose the manner in which he or she dies.  This right 
includes the right to ask for someone else to end his or her life, or to receive assistance to die. 
 
Illnesses and diseases have different medical trajectories.  Some illnesses or diseases may mean that 
a person is deprived of independence because he or she needs assistance from others for all aspects 
of living.  Some individuals may find it undignified to continue to live in circumstances where they 
must rely on others to, for example, feed them, bathe them and assist them with toileting, and may 
prefer to end their lives rather than continue to live in this fashion.35  A competent person who 
forms that view should have the right to end his or her life.    
 
2. VE or AS is necessary for the relief of pain in some situations 
 
Great improvements have been made in palliative care over the past decade.  Nevertheless, not all 
pain can be alleviated by medicine: both existential36 and some physical pain cannot be alleviated 
and may result in a request from an individual for his or her life to end.  As a society, we should not 
prevent a competent person, who is experiencing unrelenting pain or suffering, from ending his or 
her life.37 
 
                                                          
35
 See, for example, the views expressed by Dr John Elliot, an Australian doctor suffering from various illnesses 
including multiple myeloma, who travelled to Switzerland to receive assistance to die.  He chose to take this 
course as he considered that death from natural causes in Australia would involve ‘pain and the loss of his 
dignity’: A Rothschild, ‘Just When you Thought the Euthanasia Debate had Died’ (2008) 5 Bioethical Inquiry 69,  
69-70. 
36
 By existential pain, we mean pain which is not necessarily connected with physical pain.  The term refers to 
emotional or psychological pain and/or suffering.  
37
 Campbell has described the ability to choose to die to avoid extreme pain and suffering which cannot be 
alleviated by medicine as a human right: T Campbell, ‘Euthanasia as a Human Right’ in S McLean (ed), First Do 
No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Aldershot, 2008) 455. 
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3. Current regulatory framework does not work: VE and AS currently occurs   
 
Evidence that lives are ended unlawfully38 
 
There is a clear body of evidence that demonstrates that VE and AS occur despite being unlawful.39  
This includes research that examines doctors’ intentions when administering pain relieving 
medication and whether the provision of this treatment always complies with the law.  As discussed 
above, an act done with an intention to relieve pain is lawful (even if death is foreseen), but the 
same act done with an intention to kill is not lawful.40  Despite this, some doctors who are treating 
terminally ill patients intend to kill when they administer pain relieving medication, and so will be 
acting unlawfully.41  Further, the palliative practice of ‘terminal sedation’42 – where a patient is kept 
under deep continuous sedation to manage pain, while artificial nutrition and hydrating is 
withdrawn or withheld ultimately leading to death – can give rise to legal ambiguity and has 
sometimes been equated to ‘slow euthanasia’.43   
 
Consequences of unlawfulness 
 
Two adverse consequences flow from the fact that unlawful practices occur.  The first is that as 
these practices are unlawful, they are unregulated.  Regulation promotes good practice and, 
conversely, there are dangers inherent in unregulated practices, particularly where they lead to 
people’s lives being ended.  For example, for which patients is it acceptable for doctors to assist to 
die?  What practices are acceptable to achieve this purpose?  Are doctors covertly making quality of 
life assessments which result in a decision to end a person’s life?  Legalisation and regulation of VE 
and AS allows for the creation of appropriate safeguards and oversight to ensure, for example, that a 
decision to end one’s life is made only by a competent adult. 
 
The second consequence of the existence of unlawful practices is that the ongoing occurrence of 
such practices in defiance of the law brings the law into disrepute. 
 
4. The current law is incoherent 
 
As considered earlier in the paper, some decisions are lawful even though they result in a person’s 
death.44  Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment can be lawful, for example, when 
doing so is judged to be in a person’s best interests.  Providing pain relief that causes the death of a 
person will be lawful if the doctor’s intention is to relieve pain rather than to kill the patient.  This is 
the case even if the doctor foresees that the medication will end the patient’s life.  The law is 
incoherent if some deliberate acts (or omissions) which occur in the knowledge that a person will die 
                                                          
38
 Evidence of unlawful conduct in Australia relating to VE and AS is discussed further below in Section 7.1 
What happens in Australia?  
39
 See, for example, H Kuhse et al, ‘End-of-life decision-making in Australian medical practice’ (1997) 166 
Medical Journal of Australia 191; R Magnusson, Angels of Death: Exploring the Euthanasia Underground 
(Melbourne University Press, 2002); R Syme, A Good Death: an Argument for Voluntary Euthanasia 
(Melbourne University Press, 2008). 
40
 See above in Section 3.3 Provision of appropriate palliative care is lawful. 
41
 CD Douglas et al, ‘The intention to hasten death: a survey of attitudes and practices of surgeons in Australia’ 
(2001) 175 Medical Journal of Australia 511. 
42 CD Douglas, IH Kerridge and RA Ankeny, ‘Narratives of “Terminal Sedation”, and the Importance of the 
Intention-Foresight Distinction in Palliative Care Practice’ (2011) Bioethics, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-
8519.2011.01895.x (early view). 
43
 The lawfulness of this practice is likely to depend on the precise circumstances of the case, particularly the 
reasons for the provision of the sedation and the cessation or withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration.  
44
 See above in Section 3 Current legal landscape at the end of life. 
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as a result are lawful, yet others (namely VE and AS) are not.45  There is no moral distinction to 
warrant treating these situations differently. 
 
Another argument concerning incoherence of the law also arises in this context.  For many years, 
suicide has been a lawful act, yet assisting in a suicide is not.  It is odd if it is unlawful to assist 
someone to do something that is lawful. 
 
5. Public opinion is in favour of legalising VE and AS 
 
There is a long standing history of strong public support for the legalisation of VE and AS in certain 
circumstances.  A recent illustration is a survey conducted in November 2010 by the Australia 
Institute which found that 75% of respondents thought a doctor should be allowed to assist a 
terminally ill person experiencing unrelievable suffering to die at their request.46   
 
6. The current law is discriminatory 
 
The prohibition on VE and AS operates differently on individuals, depending on factors such as the 
nature of their illness and (possibly) their financial circumstances.  Some individuals have the 
physical ability to commit suicide, while the physical circumstances of others may prevent them 
from doing so.  Some individuals may have the financial resources to travel overseas to jurisdictions 
such as Switzerland where AS is lawful, while others may not.   
 
Legalising VE and AS will expand options for individuals who want to die, but currently are unable to 
end their own lives or access assistance to die. 
 
6.3 Key arguments against legalising VE and AS 
 
1. Sanctity of life   
 
Human life is paramount and it should always be illegal to commit an act with the intention of 
ending another person’s life, or assisting a person to end his or her own life.  Such arguments tend to 
be grounded in religious ideology.  As suggested by one commentator: 
 
For years the Catholic Church and most mainstream Protestant Churches have opposed any 
form of euthanasia on the grounds that decisions about life and death should be reserved for 
divine agency.47 
 
The Catholic Church’s Declaration of Euthanasia states that the practice of VE and AS is a: 
                                                          
45
 A Rothschild, ‘Just When you Thought the Euthanasia Debate had Died’ (2008) 5 Bioethical Inquiry 69, 73-74; 
L Doyal, ‘The Futility of Opposing the Legislation of Non-voluntary and Voluntary Euthanasia’ in S McLean (ed), 
First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Aldershot, 2008) 470. 
46
 The Australia Institute, ‘Survey results – attitudes to voluntary euthanasia’ (2011), available at: 
https://www.tai.org.au/index.php?q=node%2F19&pubid=822&act=display (accessed 19 August 2012). The 
question asked was:  
‘This question is about voluntary euthanasia. If someone with a terminal illness who is experiencing 
unrelievable suffering asks to die, should a doctor be allowed to assist them to die?’ Responses were: 
• Yes, voluntary euthanasia should be legal (75%) 
• No, voluntary euthanasia should be against the law (13%) 
• Not sure (12%). 
For a wider discussion of Australian attitudes in this area, see J Sikora and F Lewins, ‘Attitudes concerning 
euthanasia: Australia at the turn of the 21
st
 Century’ (2007) 16 Health Sociology Review 68. 
47
 J Sikora, ‘Religion and attitudes concerning euthanasia’ (2009) 45 Journal of Sociology 31, 33. 
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violation of the divine law, an offense against the dignity of the human person, a crime 
against life, and an attack on humanity.48 
 
The importance of human life is also recognised by our common law.  In the landmark English case of 
Bland, the House of Lords recognised that it would be lawful to withdraw life-sustaining medical 
treatment from a man in a persistent vegetative state but accepted that the ‘sanctity of life’ formed 
part of the English legal system.49  The Australian courts have also recognised the State’s interest in 
preserving human life.50 
 
The sanctity of life means that the deliberate ending of life can never be justified. 
 
2. If VE or AS is legalised, it is impossible to construct safeguards that will ensure an individual 
who falls outside the regime is not killed 
 
As can be seen from Appendix B, all statutes that have provided for VE or AS contain safeguards that 
are designed to ensure that the only people whose lives are ended or to whom assistance to die is 
provided are those who are (or were) competent and made their decision voluntarily, and who have 
particular medical conditions.  In all of those jurisdictions, there is also oversight of the relevant 
legislation.  However, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to ensure all of the legislative 
requirements relating to eligibility are satisfied in all cases.  Of particular concern may be the ability 
to ensure that the request to die was given voluntarily.  A person approaching the end of his or her 
life who relies heavily on others for all aspects of living may be pressured to end his or her life.  Such 
pressure may not necessarily be overt, and may be exerted in subtle ways.  Nevertheless, this may 
result in the fact that the request to die cannot be regarded as having been made voluntarily.  
 
This inability to ensure that safeguards are observed means there is potential for abuse in that a 
person who does not fall within the ambit of the legislation may be killed.  Vulnerable individuals in 
our society, such as the sick, the elderly and those living with disabilities, will be at risk.  
 
3. If VE or AS for competent adults is legalised, the regime will be broadened to include 
involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, and euthanasia for minors (the ‘slippery slope’ 
argument) 
 
Pursuant to the slippery slope argument, safeguards that the community agrees on to underpin 
legislative reform (for example, that only competent adults should be able to receive assistance to 
die) would, in time, be eroded, and the regime would ultimately extend to individuals who lack 
competence or to minors.  Such extensions of the regime would be morally unacceptable, yet 
difficult to resist once VE and AS are available to some members of our society.   
 
  
                                                          
48
 F Cardinal Seper, ‘Declaration on Euthanasia’ 72 Acta Apostolicae Sedis 542, 1980, Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith, available at:  
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19800505_euthana
sia_en.html (accessed 30 July 2012).  See also Pope John Paul II, ‘Evangelium Vitae’, 25 March 1995, available 
at: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html (accessed 19 August 2012). 
49
 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 859. 
50
 See, for example, Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88, [5]-[16], and most 
recently a reference by the majority of the High Court in Patel v The Queen to ‘the value the law places on 
human life’: *2012+ HCA 29, *87+. 
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4. The improvements in palliative care make the need for VE and AS obsolete 
 
The advances in medical knowledge over the past decade, particularly in the field of palliative care, 
mean that the debate about VE and AS is no longer necessary.  Palliative care has improved to such 
an extent that individuals do not have to endure physical pain throughout the dying process.  As 
such, the need to consider a legal regime of VE or AS is now obsolete. 
 
5. It is the role of doctors (and health professionals generally) to save lives and protect unwell 
people, not to kill them 
 
Medical and other health professionals are trained to save and protect human life, and improve the 
quality of the life of their patients.  It would be contrary to their fundamental role in society for 
these professionals to be asked to kill their patients, or assist their patients to end their own lives.   
A separate, but related, point is that doctors should not be forced to act in a way that is contrary to 
their conscience.  Even if a legislative regime does not require them to provide assistance, such a 
regime may require a doctor to refer the patient to someone who may be able to assist to end his or 
her life.  An obligation to make such a referral may also be contrary to their beliefs and they should 
not be required to act in a way that is contrary to their conscience. 
 
6.      If VE or AS were legalised, sick and other vulnerable people may feel coerced to end their lives 
 
Countries can and do have different cultures.  Variations occur in countries in relation to how they 
care for the aged, sick and disabled.  Some people may be concerned that the introduction of laws 
that enable us to kill the vulnerable within our community may result in a culture where there is an 
expectation that people within this group will take steps to end their lives when they reach a certain 
stage of deterioration.  Indeed, there may be a concern that vulnerable people may be subject to 
pressure, subtle or otherwise, to take such steps. 
 
A shift in existing culture of caring for the sick in our community may also lead to a reluctance of sick 
individuals to seek medical help when it is needed.  These individuals may be concerned that rather 
than be provided with assistance to manage their condition, they may be encouraged by their doctor 
to seek assistance to end their lives.   
 
6.4 The role of human dignity in this debate 
 
Before leaving this discussion of the arguments in favour of and against VE and AS, a note about 
‘human dignity’ is necessary.  Views are likely to differ regarding precisely what is encompassed by 
this term.51  Nevertheless, it is frequently cited as a reason that VE or AS should be allowed.  
Relevant to this argument is that illness and disease can result in individuals having to rely on others 
for all aspects of their lives, and living in a way that they regard as abhorrent.  The loss of dignity 
may be a significant factor in deciding that life has become unacceptable, and VE or AS would enable 
such a person to bring life to an end, and should be permitted.  On the other hand, some argue that 
human dignity, which is inherent in all individuals, is incompatible with the practice of VE and AS.  
Accordingly, neither VE nor AS should be permitted.  An argument of this kind appears to link 
concepts of human dignity and the sanctity of life.  
  
Because human dignity is a concept which is potentially relevant to both sides of this debate, it has 
not been included in the above outline of arguments for and against VE and AS.  Instead, in the 
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 The use of the term ‘dignity’ in the context of the euthanasia debate was explored in some detail in U 
Schüklenk et al, ‘End-of-Life Decision-Making in Canada: The Report by the Royal Society of Canada Expert 
Panel on End-of-Life Decision-Making’ (2011) 25 S1 Bioethics 1,38-45. 
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arguments supporting reform, dignity is considered in the narrower context as part of the 
justification for allowing individual choice in decision-making at the end of life.  On the other side, 
dignity is relevant in advancing the argument concerning the sanctity of life, and the need to protect 
human life.  
 
 
7. What happens in practice? 
 
Some of the arguments discussed in the previous section are primarily moral or ethical ones.  But 
other arguments make claims about likely future practice or draw on empirical evidence as to what 
is currently happening both in Australia and overseas (particularly those jurisdictions where VE 
and/or AS is lawful). This section considers the evidence that is available in relation to current 
practice, and does so in light of two important propositions about the implications of legalising VE 
and AS.   
 
The first proposition is that making VE and AS illegal is an effective deterrent to them occurring.  In 
this section, we refer to some of the available evidence of current practice regarding VE and AS in 
Australia, namely that the unlawful practices of VE and AS currently occur.  We do not conclude from 
this that the law should change to reflect (and regulate) current practice.  It could equally be argued 
that increased emphasis needs to be placed on enforcing the current laws.52  Rather we put forward 
this information about the extent of compliance or not with the law as relevant evidence to inform 
deliberations of how VE and AS should be regulated. 
 
The second proposition is that in jurisdictions where VE and AS are legal, there will be a slide into 
other (unacceptable) practices such as involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, or VE and AS in 
circumstances where the safeguards in the legislation are not complied with.  If this occurs, the 
vulnerable individuals within our society will be particularly at risk.53  In this section, we consider 
some of the data regarding the practice of VE and/or AS in the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland 
and Oregon to see the extent to which these concerns have been realised.  (We will not examine the 
situation in Luxembourg or Washington due to the relatively limited time that their regimes have 
been in operation.) 
 
7.1 What happens in Australia? 
 
As the practice of VE and AS is illegal, there are significant impediments to accurately quantifying the 
extent to which these practices occur in Australia.  However, there have been a few studies that 
have sought to examine this issue empirically.  One is a study by Kuhse and others which concluded 
that in 1995-1996, 1.8% of all deaths in Australia occurred due to VE and 0.1% were due to physician 
AS.54  As outlined in the next section, these statistics are broadly comparable with the position in 
permissive jurisdictions.  A noteworthy difference existed though in relation to the rate of death due 
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 J Keown, ‘Defending the Council of Europe’s Opposition to Euthanasia’ in S McLean (ed), First Do No Harm: 
Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Aldershot, 2008) 483. 
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 See above in Section 6.3 Key arguments against legalising VE and AS: ‘If VE or AS is legalised, it is impossible 
to construct safeguards that will ensure an individual who falls outside the regime is not killed’ and ‘If VE or AS 
for competent adults is legalised, the regime will be broadened to include involuntary and non-voluntary 
euthanasia, and euthanasia for minors (the ‘slippery slope’ argument)’. 
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 H Kuhse et al, ‘End-of-life decision-making in Australian medical practice’ (1997) 166 Medical Journal of 
Australia 191. 
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to ‘ending life without patient’s explicit request’: Kuhse and her colleagues noted it was significantly 
higher in Australia (3.5%) than in the Netherlands (0.7%, at the comparable time of 1995).55  
 
A qualitative study by Magnusson has also documented sustained unlawful conduct relating to VE 
and AS.  His book, entitled ‘The Euthanasia Underground’, details the involvement of 49 people in 
deaths through euthanasia (voluntary and otherwise) and AS.56  There is also a body of work that has 
been done on intention when providing pain relieving medication.  Some doctors who treat 
terminally ill patients intend to kill (rather than only relieve pain) when they administer palliative 
care, and so will be acting unlawfully.57 
 
In addition to this empirical research, there is a body of anecdotal evidence that VE and AS occurs in 
Australia.  For example, seven Melbourne doctors published an open letter to the then Victorian 
Premier that appeared on the front page of ‘The Age’ newspaper, admitting to having performed 
euthanasia.58  The letter formed part of a campaign to legalise AS.  Dr Rodney Syme was one of those 
doctors, and he has also published a book which revealed his involvement in assisting patients to 
end their lives.59   
 
While there is not comprehensive evidence in relation to the extent to which VE and AS occurs in 
Australia, there is clear evidence that such practices do take place despite being unlawful, giving rise 
to potential for those involved to be prosecuted.60 
 
7.2 What happens in the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Oregon? 
 
A vast body of literature exists about current practices in jurisdictions that permit VE and/or AS.  This 
literature includes official reports that are legislatively mandated as part of government oversight of 
these practices, as well as publications resulting from formal and comprehensive reviews of law and 
practice that are conducted from time to time.61  However, the bulk of the literature is comprised of 
papers published in scholarly journals, frequently by commentators who have an entrenched view, 
one way or the other, about whether such practices should be lawful.  Some of this literature reports 
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 R Magnusson, Angels of Death: Exploring the Euthanasia Underground (Melbourne University Press, 2002). 
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on empirical research that has been conducted in permissive jurisdictions, providing data on the 
extent to which VE and AS occurs.  Some commentators express concern in this writing that 
permissive jurisdictions, and most notably the Netherlands, have witnessed an expansion in VE and 
AS practices which has lead to the vulnerable in our society being placed at risk.62  The literature 
includes concerns about the difficulties of ensuring that the legislative safeguards embodied in the 
legislation are observed, and that the practice of VE and AS is limited to the circumstances 
contemplated by the legislation.  Other commentators express concern that the assertions raised in 
such literature are either overstated, not supported by the available empirical evidence, or in direct 
conflict with that evidence.63   
 
For any jurisdiction contemplating how best to regulate VE and AS, it is critical to establish what has 
occurred in those jurisdictions that have enacted legislation.  Such information facilitates an 
informed debate and decision-making process.  However, for the reasons explained above, there is a 
need to be cautious in reviewing and interpreting the available literature on the practices that are 
currently occurring.64  Only a careful engagement with the available data and broader literature will 
enable policy makers to assess whether the concerns expressed about the practices in permissible 
jurisdictions, particularly about the risk to which the vulnerable in our society will be exposed, are 
justified. 
 
For the purpose of this paper, we are not able to undertake a comprehensive review of the body of 
literature that is in the public domain in this area.  Instead, we provide a snapshot of current 
practice, drawing on the recent review of empirical research undertaken by the Royal Society of 
Canada Expert Panel on End-of-Life Decision-Making.65   
 
Netherlands 
 
Information about medical practice at the end of life that is available in the Netherlands is helpful, as 
surveys have been undertaken at regular intervals since 1990.  This enables trends in practice to be 
linked with the legal regime that operated at the relevant time.  These legal changes over time are 
summarised below:66 
 
 1973 – Case law recognised that a doctor could lawfully shorten a person’s life to prevent 
serious and irremediable suffering (although VE and AS were punishable in all circumstances).  
Despite this concession, in this case, the doctor was found guilty (although did not receive a 
harsh penalty).  The law as a result of this case, therefore, remained unclear. 
 1984 – There was further case law development and it was recognised that where a doctor was 
faced with a request from a patient to die, the doctor faced a conflict of duty.  He or she was 
entitled to assist the patient to die under the doctrine of necessity. 
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 1994-2002 – Prosecutorial guidelines operated which indicated when a doctor would and would 
not be charged in relation to ending a patient’s life or assisting the patient to die. 
 2002 – Legislation was passed and doctors could not be prosecuted if they acted with ‘due care’ 
as defined in the legislation. 
 
The collection of empirical data about end of life medical practice was sponsored by the Dutch 
government to obtain information about the kind of practice that was occurring and demographics 
of those people who are dying as a result of the relevant legal regime.  Nationwide surveys were 
conducted in 1990, 1995, 2001, 200567 and 201068 and they resulted in the below data in Table 3.69 
 
Table 3: Deaths due to VE and AS as a percentage of total deaths in the Netherlands 
 
 1990 1995 2001 2005 2010 
Annual number 
of deaths 
128,824 135,675 140,377 136,402 136,056 
% % % % % 
VE 1.7 2.4 2.6 1.7 2.8 
AS 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Life-terminating 
acts without 
explicit request 
of the patient70 
0.8 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.2 
Total 2.7 3.3 3.5 2.2 3.1 
 
Belgium 
 
The Belgian Act came into effect in 2002.  A Federal Control and Evaluation Commission was 
established to oversee the operation of the legislation.  The Commission has published reports on 
the instances of euthanasia since the commencement of the legislation.  Between September 2002 
and the end of 2003, the number of reported cases of euthanasia was 259; for the years 2004 and 
2005, the number was 742; and for the years 2006 and 2007, the number was 924.71 
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The figures in Table 4 below allow comparisons in practice between 1998 (when VE was illegal) and 
2007 (when VE was legal).72  Of particular interest is the decrease in the percentage of deaths that 
occurred as a result of action taken by a doctor without the explicit request of the patient. 
 
Table 4: Deaths due to VE and AS as a percentage of total deaths in Belgium 
 
 1998 2007 
 % % 
VE 1.1 1.9 
AS 0.12 0.07 
Life-terminating acts without explicit request of 
the patient 
3.2 1.8 
Total 4.42 3.77 
 
Switzerland 
 
It will be recalled that law reform has not occurred in Switzerland to permit VE or AS.  However, AS 
that occurs other than for ‘selfish motives’ is not illegal.  As a result of this, assistance to die does not 
have to be provided by a doctor.  Also, there are not any residence requirements, so people are 
allowed to travel to Switzerland to receive assistance to die. 
 
There are four major right-to-die organisations in Switzerland that have been established to assist 
individuals to end their lives: ‘Exit – German Switzerland (Exit GS)’, ‘Exit – French Switzerland’, 
‘Dignitas’ and ‘Exit International’.  One research project reviewed the assistance provided by Exit GS 
with that provided by Dignitas for the period 2001-2004.  This review revealed that Exit GS was 
involved in 147 suicides, and Dignitas in 274.73  Dignitas has reported that it has assisted 15 
Australians to die between the years of 2003 and 2011.74 
 
Oregon75 
 
The Oregon legislation, which survived a number of legal challenges since it was passed in 1994, had 
its first full year of operation in 1998.  In 2008, the Department of Human Services published a 
summary report which reviewed how the legislation had functioned over the first decade of its 
operation.  During this period, 341 people died after ingesting medication that had been prescribed 
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under the Death with Dignity Act.76  Table 5 below provides statistics of prescription history during 
this decade.77 
 
Table 5: Prescriptions filled and used, and death under Oregon’s assisted suicide regime 
 
Year Prescriptions filled Deaths Percentage of prescriptions 
used 
1998 24 16 67 
1999 33 27 82 
2000 39 27 69 
2001 44 21 50 
2002 58 38 66 
2003 68 42 62 
2004 60 37 62 
2005 65 38 58 
2006 65 46 71 
2007 85 49 58 
 
Total = 541 Total = 341 
Average used = 65% 
 Average not used = 35% 
 
An interesting observation from the above data is that approximately one-third of individuals who 
obtained a prescription for medication did not use it.  The summary report also provided 
demographic details of those who sought assistance to die under the legislation, and motivations for 
using the legislation:78 
 Those who sought medication were more likely to be better educated than those who died of 
natural causes; 
 There was no evidence that women and older people (aged more than 84) were more likely to 
seek assistance; 
 Minority groups (Blacks, Hispanics and Native Americans) were under-represented as those 
seeking assistance; 
 Divorced and never married individuals were more likely to seek assistance; 
 Fear of losing control and autonomy were the most frequently cited reasons for seeking 
assistance; and 
 Being a burden on family and friends was also cited as a concern for almost half of the 
individuals seeking assistance. 
 
 
8. A framework for considering regulatory options for VE and AS 
 
The foregoing discussions reveal a range of views and considerations that inform decisions about the 
shape of the law in this area.  This section proposes a framework for considering what position the 
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law should take on VE and AS. We start by asking whether VE and AS should be criminal acts.  If this 
conduct should continue to be regulated by the criminal law in this way, decisions need to be made 
about whether the current approach should be retained or whether the criminal law should treat 
this conduct more strictly or leniently. On the other hand, if VE and AS should be decriminalised, 
then issues arise as to how this conduct should be regulated.  In both instances, appropriate vehicles 
for achieving any recommended policy outcomes need to be evaluated. This proposed framework 
for considering regulatory options is represented in diagrammatic form in Appendix C. 
 
8.1 Should VE and/or AS be criminal acts? 
 
A threshold question is whether VE and/or AS should be criminal acts.  Commentators have 
identified a number of functions of criminal law.79 Two that have particular significance here are the 
punishment of an offender to formally and publicly denounce conduct as morally culpable, and the 
protection of the community from harm through deterrence.  These functions inform assessments 
as to whether VE and AS should attract criminal responsibility, along with consideration of the 
arguments for and against legalisation outlined above and the available evidence as to current 
practice in Australia and in the permissive jurisdictions. 
 
The heading to this section deliberately contains a reference to ‘and/or’ because it is possible to 
favour either VE or AS being a criminal act but not both.  Where a distinction is made between these 
two courses of action, it is generally to permit AS but not VE.  Some favour this approach attaching 
moral significance to who is the final agent of death, namely the person who has died rather than 
the person assisting.  Others disagree pointing to, for example, the discriminatory effect of a 
distinction that precludes assistance to die from those people with an illness or disability where they 
cannot do the final act themselves to end their life. 
 
8.2 If VE and/or AS should be criminal acts 
 
Culpability of VE and AS 
 
If VE and/or AS should be criminal acts, then the next issue to consider is how seriously the criminal 
law should treat this conduct.  The law could retain its current approach, or it could punish this 
conduct more or less than it presently does. 
 
In terms of the current position, as noted above, VE and AS are unlawful in all Australian States and 
Territories, and police and prosecutors have pursued criminal proceedings where there is evidence 
to support that course of action.80  However, for those who are convicted, the sentences imposed 
tend to be at the very low end of what is possible for these offences, often not involving a period of 
                                                          
79
 See, for example, D Lanham et al, Criminal Laws in Australia (Federation Press, 2006) in ch 1B ‘The Purposes 
of Criminal Law’, available at: http://www.federationpress.com.au/pdf/Lanham%20Ch1B.pdf (accessed 11 
September 2012).  
80
  M Otlowski, ‘Mercy Killing Cases in the Australian Criminal Justice System’ (1993) 17 Criminal Law Journal 
10; L Bartels and M Otlowski, ‘A right to die? Euthanasia and the law in Australia’ (2010) 17 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 532. Note the case of Daryl Stephens, a urologist in Western Australia, where the Director of Public 
Prosecutions pursued criminal charges despite a magistrate initially finding there was insufficient evidence to 
warrant taking the matter to trial: D Weber, ‘Doctor releases book on woman's death’, PM, 8 October 2002, 
available at: http://www.abc.net.au/pm/stories/s696378.htm (accessed 19 August 2012). 
27 
 
imprisonment.81  One available policy choice is to retain this current position. It is important that this 
is acknowledged as a choice – leaving the status quo unchanged involves a decision not to act.82  
 
Another option is for the criminal law to treat VE and AS as more serious criminal acts than it 
presently does. Some who are of this view would argue that the law is inadequate in the way it 
marks this conduct as morally wrong and that it fails to adequately safeguard those who need the 
protection of the criminal law such as the elderly, people with disabilities and those who are 
otherwise vulnerable.  
 
A third option is to accept that the criminal law has a role to play in prohibiting VE and AS but that 
this conduct is not as morally blameworthy as current law and practice state.  This might involve 
acknowledging the symbolic importance of prohibiting this conduct as unlawful but taking a more 
lenient approach when dealing with people who acted with compassionate motives when assisting 
with a death or ending another’s life.  This could be achieved, for example, by not only taking a 
lenient approach to sentencing as already occurs, but also to the offences that are charged in such 
cases. 
 
Legal options for change 
 
For those who believe that VE and AS should be criminal acts, there are a number of legal options to 
either change the criminal law or how it is applied.  Key options discussed here are sentencing 
reform, changes to the relevant offences that apply, and the use of prosecutorial discretion through 
offence-specific guidelines. 
 
Sentencing reform 
 
The sentences that can be imposed for VE and AS vary depending on the crime of which the person 
has been convicted and the State or Territory in which he or she lives.83 For example, the sentence 
for murder in Australia is either a mandatory or maximum (but discretionary) life sentence whereas 
the maximum sentence for manslaughter varies from a discretionary life sentence to 20 years 
imprisonment. The maximum sentence for AS varies between life imprisonment to five years across 
the country. However, these sentences are the maximum available to the court and, as noted above, 
sentencing discretion in these cases has tended to be very much towards the lower end of the 
scale.84 
 
Some may consider the current approach to sentencing cases of VE and AS to be too lenient.  
Reform is needed to ensure that judges take adequate account of the gravity of the crime that has 
been committed, a crime that has led to a person’s death.  It could be argued that the current trend 
of non-custodial sentences should be reversed and that some period of imprisonment is necessary in 
such cases.  Conversely, others argue that while it may be appropriate that the criminal law marks 
that a death has occurred, the imprisonment of a person who has assisted another to die at their 
request is unjust.  These people should not be treated as ‘criminals’ and alternatives such as the use 
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of diversionary programs from the mainstream criminal justice system represent more appropriate 
sentencing options. 
 
Sentencing reform could be achieved through legislation, for example reducing the maximum 
sentence or, alternatively, imposing a mandatory minimum sentence.  It could also be achieved 
through judicial means, for example, an appeal court delivering a judgment indicating the need to 
treat these offences more seriously (or leniently) than has occurred in the past. Change could also be 
supported through sentencing advisory councils in those States that have them. 
 
Context-specific offences  
 
Another option for reform is to amend the criminal law to create a specific offence for VE that is less 
serious than murder and manslaughter; an offence that recognises the particular context in which 
this conduct occurs.  An example might be an offence of ‘mercy killing’ which is treated less seriously 
than murder or manslaughter by the criminal law.  Arguments in favour of such an approach are that 
it recognises that such conduct is a criminal act but acknowledges that prosecution for crimes like 
murder or manslaughter is disproportionate to the person’s culpability.  AS already has its own 
specific offence but there is also greater scope to recognise that criminal culpability for those 
assisting suicide may vary depending on the circumstances of the case.  This variation could be 
recognised within the existing offence provision, or through the creation of a new offence that deals 
with different instances of AS. 
 
A related development in three jurisdictions is to limit the offences available where a death occurs 
pursuant to a failed suicide pact. In New South Wales, those involved in suicide pacts may not be 
found guilty of murder and manslaughter but rather only the reduced charge of AS85 while in South 
Australia and Victoria, a murder charge is not open but rather only the crime of manslaughter.86 
 
Prosecutorial guidelines  
 
A third legal option for reform is to develop prosecutorial guidelines that deal specifically with when 
VE and AS will and will not be prosecuted.87  Prosecutors in Australia have a discretion not to charge 
or prosecute a person where they conclude that doing so would not be in the public interest.  In 
England and Wales, the Director of Public Prosecutions has developed a policy specifically dealing 
with AS and when it will and will not be in the public interest to prosecute such cases.88   
 
This reform option continues to recognise the criminality of such conduct but creates a discretion for 
the criminal law not to be enforced in appropriate cases.  This may be a decision to not prosecute at 
all, or it may be a conditional decision that prosecution will not occur provided the person 
participates in a diversionary program of some kind.  Alternatively, the prosecution may still occur 
but the discretion is exercised to charge the person with a less serious offence.  However, 
prosecutorial guidelines need not be a ‘reform option’.  For example, they have been used in the 
Australian Capital Territory not to achieve a liberalisation of prosecutorial practice, but rather to 
clarify the current law governing the end of life and how it will be enforced.89  
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A final point to note is that the use of prosecutorial guidelines is potentially quite different from the 
sentencing and offence reform options considered above. Those reform options are premised on the 
final result being a criminal conviction whereas the use of prosecutorial guidelines, if the discretion 
is used to not prosecute, can lead to a person avoiding the criminal justice system. In this way, it is 
possible for them to operate as de facto decriminalisation.  
 
8.3 If VE and/or AS should not be criminal acts 
 
We turn now to consider the alternative position where VE and AS should not be criminal acts but 
rather be regulated like other potentially lawful activity.  This brings with it choices about the scope 
of conduct that should be permitted and regulated, and the legal reform options available to achieve 
that. 
 
What conduct should be permitted and regulated? 
 
One significant issue is whether VE, AS or both should be permitted and then regulated.  As noted 
above, it is possible for the law to permit one but not the other.  There are also a range of other 
factors that would need to be considered when designing a regulatory system that permits this 
conduct. 
 
 Competence:  Most permissive regimes provide that VE or AS may occur only in relation to a 
person who is competent to make their own decisions and, as outlined above, this paper deals 
only with VE and AS in this context.90  
 
 Voluntary and informed choice:  Permissive regimes generally have processes to support 
decision-making that is voluntary and informed.  
 
 A person’s condition:  An issue is whether a regulatory system should require a person to have a 
particular type of illness or condition.  For example, does a person have to have a terminal illness 
or be experiencing unacceptable suffering?  Some argue against these limitations as 
representing an infringement of a person’s autonomy. Others consider them to be 
discriminatory, for example, against an individual with disabilities who may not be able to satisfy 
a terminal illness requirement but who considers his or her life intolerable. On the other hand, 
these limitations can be seen as an appropriate safeguard to ensure that the system is limited to 
those who are suffering unbearably. 
 
 Decision-making process:  Legislative regulatory systems have traditionally established a 
decision-making framework for accessing VE or AS.  For example, there may be requirements as 
to the number and form (eg in writing) of requests for assistance, timing before assistance can 
be provided, and assessments by doctors. The role of doctors gives rise to other questions.  Do 
they need to be involved?  Are they the decision-makers as to when assistance may 
appropriately be provided or is their role more limited?  Some argue that involvement of doctors 
can harm the doctor/patient relationship and erode trust and the ethic of care.  Others argue 
that doctors must be involved to ensure access to information about treatment options, the safe 
and painless bringing about of death, and appropriate assessments of competence. 
 
 Oversight of decisions:  A final issue is to establish oversight mechanisms that ensure the system 
is operating properly and in accordance with the regulatory framework.  Permissive legislative 
                                                          
90
 See above in Section 2 Definitions and scope of paper. 
30 
 
regimes establish various oversight mechanisms, but they vary with some focusing on assessing 
the appropriateness of individual decisions and others on systemic issues.  An issue for regimes 
that focus on scrutiny of individual decision-making is whether any oversight should be 
prospective or retrospective.  Another issue is the nature of any regulator and whether this 
oversight should be part of the criminal justice system, the coronial system, the political system 
(such as a parliamentary committee), the health system, or a combination of them. 
 
Legal options for change 
 
There are three main options for legal change where VE and AS are not criminal acts.  The first is that 
the law that prohibits VE and AS is judicially found to be invalid. The second is where a defence in 
the criminal law is created either by judicial decision or by statute.  The third is the more common 
situation where a legislative framework is established to decriminalise and then regulate VE and AS. 
 
Invalidity of laws prohibiting VE and AS 
 
One option for legal change is to judicially challenge the validity of criminal laws so far as they 
prohibit VE and AS.  This occurred recently in Canada where the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
declared that provisions of the Criminal Code prohibiting this conduct unjustifiably infringed various 
rights protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.91  The Court declared that the 
relevant provisions of the Code were invalid but that the declaration would only take effect in a year 
to give Parliament time to consider how it might alter the law to be consistent with the Charter.92   
 
This method of reform is unlikely to succeed in Australia.  Only Victoria and the Australian Capital 
Territory have human rights instruments and Australian human rights jurisprudence generally is 
much less developed than in other similar jurisdictions such as Canada and the United Kingdom. 
There is not yet the same track record of effecting legal change in Australia through human rights as 
there is in some countries overseas.  Further, a recent court challenge to this area of law failed in the 
United Kingdom, where one of the arguments specifically rejected by the court was that the law 
prohibiting VE and AS was incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).93 
 
Even if such a challenge was successful in Australia, one of the problems that arises is that there can 
be uncertainty as to the legal situation that exists after the invalid aspects of the law fall away.  Part 
of this relates to the difficulties of establishing the circumstances in which the law trespasses beyond 
its reach and those where it may still apply.  Lynn Smith J of the British Columbian Supreme Court 
sought to establish criteria for when the law would be invalid, however, the nature of judge made 
law often means that this lacks the precision and certainty that can be achieved with legislative 
reform.94 A judicial challenge can, however, act as a trigger for legislative reform to address the 
human rights concerns identified. 
 
Defence to criminal law prosecution  
 
A second law reform option is to not make VE or AS lawful, but to create a defence that doctors (or 
others) may rely upon to avoid criminal responsibility. This can occur through judicial decision. This 
                                                          
91
 Carter v Canada (Attorney-General) [2012] BCSC 886. 
92
 The Supreme Court decision is currently being appealed by Canada’s federal government: ‘Appeal Court 
upholds B.C. woman's exemption from doctor-assisted suicide ban’, 10 August 2012, available at: 
http://www.canada.com/health/Appeal+Court+upholds+womans+exemption+from+doctorassisted+suicide/7
071822/story.html (accessed 19 August 2012). 
93
 Nicklinson, R (on the application of) v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381. 
94
 Nicklinson, R (on the application of) v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381, [86]. 
31 
 
happened in the State of Montana, in the United States, where the law recognises consent as a 
general defence to a criminal charge, provided doing so is not ‘against public policy’.  The question 
before the Supreme Court of Montana was whether a doctor may rely on the consent defence if 
they provide assistance to die to a terminally ill, competent adult at his or her request.  Without this 
defence, the doctors were potentially liable to be charged with homicide.  The Court concluded that 
allowing doctors to assist patients was not against public policy and that the consent defence would 
be available to a doctor if the State chose to prosecute him or her.95   
 
The prospect of judicial reform of this type in Australia is again limited: the law in Australia in 
relation to consent is different from Montana and a recent attempt in England to rely on the 
common law ‘defence of necessity’ was rejected.96 However, a defence governing VE and AS can also 
be created by statute and this model was adopted by a South Australian Bill: the Criminal Law 
Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011.  Under the Bill, 
a defence to homicide97 is created for a treating doctor to administer drugs where he or she believes 
on reasonable grounds that the life of an adult of sound mind was intolerable to that person.  Such 
action must be at the request of the person and be regarded as a ‘reasonable response to the 
suffering’.  Of note is that the Bill expressly provides that the onus of proof rests on the doctor on 
the balance of probabilities to demonstrate that he or she falls within the protection provided by the 
defence.  This criminal defence model is also consistent with how AS is regulated in Switzerland with 
people being allowed to assist another to die, provided they are acting with unselfish motives.98 
 
As noted above, this model (whether it is achieved through judicial or legislative reform) does not 
make VE and AS lawful, but rather creates a defence for such conduct.  One of the implications of 
this is that usually at least some of the onus of demonstrating that criminal responsibility should not 
be imposed rests on the person who is alleged to have participated in VE or AS.  Some would regard 
this as a disadvantage as the conduct still remains in the criminal law realm.  Others would consider 
this appropriate.  The comments made earlier about the potential uncertainty of judge made law 
would also apply here to a judicially created defence; the enactment of a legislative defence allows 
for greater precision.99 
 
Statutory framework to regulate the practice 
 
A final reform option, and one favoured most by VE and AS advocates, is the creation of a statutory 
framework to permit and regulate the practice.  This is the most common approach taken in the 
permissive jurisdictions, and the various models in operation are discussed above.100 
 
This option is the most permissive as it shifts this conduct outside the criminal law realm.  Much of 
the commentary about the advantages and disadvantages of reform has focused explicitly on this 
model.  Such an approach presents the best chance of these three reform options to enhance 
decision-making in this area as these regimes generally prescribe a clear process of decision-making 
before VE and AS are lawful which is accompanied by some oversight mechanism. 
 
 
  
                                                          
95
 Baxter v Montana (2009) 354 Mont. 234.  Judicial reform also occurred in Colombia: see above note 26. 
96
 Nicklinson, R (on the application of) v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381. 
97
 The Bill also creates defences for AS and other offences that might conceivably be charged in this context. 
98
 See above in Section 5.2 Switzerland. 
99
 Nicklinson, R (on the application of) v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381, [86]. 
100
 See above in Section 5 Legislative schemes that permit voluntary euthanasia and/or assisted suicide. 
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9. What should happen next? 
 
This paper has drawn together some of the key issues in the vast body of literature dealing with law, 
practice and opinion relating to VE and AS.  It outlined the broader legal landscape at the end of life, 
the attempts to make these practices lawful in Australia, and the situation in those jurisdictions 
where VE and/or AS are lawful. It also considered the practices at the end of life in Australia and 
overseas, the arguments that have been advanced in favour of and against legalisation, and possible 
reform options. We have attempted to approach this exercise in a balanced way that acknowledges 
the complexity of these issues and the diversity of views held.   
 
While a paper like this cannot be comprehensive, it provides a departure point for a conversation by 
interested parties about the future of how VE and AS should be regulated.  Part of that conversation 
will include identifying what further research and information will be needed to properly consider 
this issue. At various places in this paper, we have suggested where further work is needed to inform 
consideration of these issues. 
 
We hope that the debate and discussion that follows can put aside some of the sloganism and 
rhetoric that have sometimes dominated public and political discourse in this area.  VE and AS are 
complex issues that give rise to a range of competing considerations.  Rational engagement with law, 
ethics and practice can be obscured by outlandish claims and emotive language, and this has 
occurred in the past on both sides of the debate.  We are hopeful for a new dawn of engagement on 
this issue where people of differing views are genuinely interested in understanding the perspectives 
of others. 
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Appendix A 
 
Legislative reform attempts in Australia 
 
Jurisdiction Name of bill Date introduced Who introduced Where introduced 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Medical  Treatment (Amendment) Bill 1995 20 September 1995 Michael Moore (Independent) Legislative Assembly 
Euthanasia Referendum Bill 1997 18 June 1997 Michael Moore (Independent) Legislative Assembly 
New South Wales Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2001 29 November 2001 Ian Cohen  (Australian Greens) Legislative Council 
Voluntary Euthanasia Trial (Referendum) Bill 2002 9 April 2002 (Notice of motion) Ian Cohen  (Australian Greens) Legislative Council 
Voluntary Euthanasia Trial (Referendum) Bill 2003 17 September 2003 Ian Cohen  (Australian Greens) Legislative Council 
Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2003 30 April 2003 (Notice of motion) Ian Cohen (Australian Greens) Legislative Council 
Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2010 22 September 2010 (Notice of motion) Cate Faehrmann  (Australian Greens) Legislative Council 
Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2010 19 October 2010 (Notice of motion) Cate Faehrmann  (Australian Greens) Legislative Council 
Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2011 2 August 2011  (Notice of motion) Cate Faehrmann  (Australian Greens) Legislative Council 
Northern Territory Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 1995
101
 22 February 1995 Marshall Perron (Country Liberal Party) Legislative Assembly 
South Australia 
  
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 1995 9 March 1995 John Quirke (ALP) House of Assembly 
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 1996 6 November 1996 Anne Levy  (ALP) Legislative Council 
Dignity in Dying Bill 2001 14 March 2001 Sandra Kanck  (Australian Democrats) Legislative Council 
Dignity in Dying Bill 2001 15 March 2001 Dr Bob Such (Independent) House of Assembly 
Dignity in Dying Bill 2003 24 September 2003 Dr Bob Such (Independent) House of Assembly 
Dignity in Dying Bill 2005 16 February 2005 Dr Bob Such (Independent) House of Assembly 
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2006 14 March 2007 Dr Bob Such (Independent) House of Assembly 
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2007 31 May 2007 Dr Bob Such (Independent) House of Assembly 
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2008 16 October 2008 Dr Bob Such (Independent) House of Assembly 
Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care 
(Voluntary Euthanasia) Amendment Bill 2008 
12 November 2008 Mark Parnell (Australian Greens) Legislative Council 
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 24 June 2010 Dr Bob Such (Independent) House of Assembly 
Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care (End 
of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2010 
16 September 2010 Stephanie Key (ALP) House of Assembly 
Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care (End 
of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2010  
29 September 2010 Mark Parnell (Australian Greens) Legislative Council 
Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of 
Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011 
10 March 2011 Stephanie Key (ALP) House of Assembly 
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2012 1 March 2012 Dr Bob Such (Independent) House of Assembly 
Tasmania Dying with Dignity Bill 2009 26 May 2009 Nicholas McKim (Australian Greens) House of Assembly 
                                                          
101
 This bill was ultimately passed and became the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 (NT), which was subsequently repealed by Commonwealth legislation (see note 102 
below). 
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Jurisdiction Name of bill Date introduced Who introduced Where introduced 
Victoria Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 28 May 2008 Colleen Hartland (Australian Greens) Legislative Council 
Western Australia Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 1997 16 October 1997 Norm Kelly (Australian Democrats) Legislative Council 
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 1998 20 August 1998 Norm Kelly (Australian Democrats) Legislative Council 
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2000 10 May 2000 Norm Kelly (Australian Democrats) Legislative Council 
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2000 19 October 2000 Norm Kelly (Australian Democrats) Legislative Council 
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2002 18 September 2002 Robin Chapple (Australian Greens) Legislative Council 
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 20 May 2010 Robin Chapple (Australian Greens) Legislative Council 
Commonwealth 
 
Euthanasia Laws Bill 1996
102
 9 September 1996 Kevin Andrews (Liberal Party) House of Representatives 
Euthanasia Laws (Repeal) Bill 2004 3 March 2004 Lyn Allison (Australian Democrats) Senate 
Australian Territories Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2007 8 February 2007 Bob Brown (Australian Greens) Senate 
Rights of the Terminally Ill (Euthanasia Laws Repeal) Bill 
2008 
14 February 2008 Bob Brown (Australian Greens) Senate 
Restoring Territory Rights (Voluntary Euthanasia 
Legislation) Bill 2008 
17 September 2008 Bob Brown (Australian Greens) Senate 
Restoring Territory Rights (Voluntary Euthanasia 
Legislation) Bill 2010 
29 September 2010 Bob Brown (Australian Greens) Senate 
  
                                                          
102
 Note that this Bill was passed and overruled the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 (NT).  There were subsequently a number of attempts made by Senators to overturn 
the effect of the Commonwealth Act (and these are listed above). 
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Appendix B 
 
Legislation in permissive jurisdictions 
 
 Northern Territory Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg Oregon Washington 
 
Overview of the regulation 
 
Name of legislation Rights of the Terminally Ill 
Act 1995 
Termination of Life on 
Request and Assisted 
Suicide Act 2000 
Act on Euthanasia 2002 Law of 16 March 2009 on 
Euthanasia and Assisted 
Suicide 
Death with Dignity Act 
1994 
Washington Death with 
Dignity Act 
Year commenced 
operation 
1996 2002 
 
2002 
 
2009 
 
1997 2009 
 
Nature of activity 
that is regulated 
VE and AS VE and AS VE
103
 VE and AS AS AS 
 
Eligibility requirements 
 
Must be an adult? Yes No 
Legislation extends to: 
(a)Minor between 16 and 
18 who has a reasonable 
understanding of own 
interests (where parents 
or guardians involved in 
decision-making process) 
(b)Minor between 12 and 
16 who has a reasonable 
understanding of own 
interests (where parents 
or guardians agree) 
No 
Legislation extends to 
emancipated minors 
Yes Yes Yes 
                                                          
103
 Although the Belgian legislation does not expressly permit AS, the prevailing view is that it is covered by the regime: see above note 30. 
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 Northern Territory Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg Oregon Washington 
Must be 
competent at time 
death occurs? 
Yes No 
Legislation is not limited 
to competent individuals.  
It is also available for a 
person (16 years and 
older) who previously 
made a written request 
for termination of life 
No 
Legislation is not limited 
to competent individuals.  
An advance directive 
requesting euthanasia 
that was made when a 
person was competent 
can also be acted upon 
No 
Legislation is not limited 
to competent individuals.  
A person can also make 
‘end-of-life provisions in 
writing’ when competent 
to request euthanasia be 
performed if he or she 
becomes unconscious, 
has a ‘severe and 
incurable accidental or 
pathological disorder’ and 
the situation is 
irreversible 
Yes Yes 
Must person have 
a terminal illness? 
Yes No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Is pain and/or 
suffering required? 
Yes   
Illness is causing ‘severe 
pain or suffering’ 
Yes  
Suffering must be ‘lasting 
and unbearable’ 
Yes 
Patient must be in a 
‘medically futile condition 
of constant and 
unbearable physical or 
mental suffering that can 
not be alleviated’ 
Yes 
Patient must show 
‘constant and unbearable 
physical or mental 
suffering without 
prospects of 
improvement’ 
No No 
Must person be a 
resident in the 
jurisdiction? 
No No
104
 
 
No 
However, doctor must be 
satisfied of the ‘durable’ 
nature of the patient’s 
request. To this end, the 
doctor must have ‘several 
conversations with the 
patient spread out over a 
reasonable period of 
time’. 
No 
However, the doctor must 
have treated the patient 
for some time to ensure 
the ‘persistence’ of the 
patient’s suffering, and to 
hold ‘several interviews 
with the patient, at 
reasonable intervals’.   
Yes Yes 
                                                          
104
 Compare the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs which has stated that it would be ‘impossible’ for a non-resident to receive VE or AS on the basis that a close 
doctor-patient relationship is needed for the requirements of the legislation to be met: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Termination of Life on Request and 
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act in practice, FAQ Euthanasia, 2010.  It is not clear, however, on the face of the legislation as to why a person must be a resident for 
this to be so. 
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 Northern Territory Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg Oregon Washington 
 
Safeguards 
 
Involvement of 
health 
professionals 
2 doctors and a 
psychiatrist 
2 doctors 2 doctors (unless not 
expected to die in near 
future and, if so, 3 
doctors) 
2 doctors 2 doctors 2 doctors 
Legitimacy of 
request 
2 doctors must be 
satisfied that request 
made ‘freely, voluntarily 
and after due 
consideration’ 
2 doctors must be 
satisfied that the ‘request 
... was voluntary and well-
considered’ 
Doctor to be satisfied that 
the ‘request is voluntary, 
well-considered and 
repeated, and is not the 
result of any external 
pressure’ 
Doctor to be satisfied that 
the ‘request is made 
voluntarily, after 
reflection and, if 
necessary, repeated, and 
does not result from 
external pressure’ 
2 doctors satisfied that 
request is made 
voluntarily 
2 doctors satisfied that 
request is made 
voluntarily 
Patient must be 
professionally 
informed 
Patient informed of the 
nature and likely course 
of illness and medical 
treatment and other 
support (including 
counselling and 
psychiatric support) 
available 
Patient informed of the 
‘situation he was in and 
about his prospects’ 
Patient informed about 
health condition, life 
expectancy, the possible 
palliative and therapeutic 
courses of action and 
their consequences 
Patient informed about 
state of health and life 
expectancy, therapeutic 
and palliative possibilities 
and their consequences 
Patient informed of 
diagnosis and prognosis, 
risks and result of taking 
the medication, and 
alternative treatment 
(including comfort care, 
hospice care and pain 
control) 
Patient informed of 
diagnosis and prognosis, 
risks and result of taking 
the medication, and 
alternative treatment 
(including comfort care, 
hospice care and pain 
control) 
Cooling off period Yes  
At least 7 days between 
advising doctor of 
decision and signing of 
certificate; and 2 days 
from signing the 
certificate. 
[Legislation is silent] Doctor must be certain of 
the ‘durable’ nature of 
request.  Doctor must 
have had ‘several 
conversations with the 
patient spread out over a 
reasonable period of 
time’ (and if patient is not 
expected to die in near 
future, there must be at 
least one month between 
the written request and 
the act of euthanasia) 
Doctor to ‘hold several 
interviews with the 
patient, at reasonable 
intervals having regard to 
the evolution of the 
patient’s condition’ 
Yes  
No less than 15 days 
between patient’s initial 
oral request and writing 
prescription for 
medication; no less than 
48 hours between the 
written request and 
writing a prescription for 
medication. 
Yes  
No less than 15 days 
between patient’s initial 
oral request and writing 
prescription for 
medication; no less than 
48 hours between the 
written request and 
writing a prescription for 
medication. 
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 Northern Territory Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg Oregon Washington 
Relevance of 
depression 
Patient is ‘not suffering 
from treatable clinical 
depression in respect of 
the illness’ 
Legislation is silent 
regarding a patient who 
suffers from depression.   
However, the request 
must be ‘well-
considered’.  If depression 
affects the patient’s 
judgment, this may have 
an impact on whether the 
doctor can regard the 
request as ‘well-
considered’. 
Legislation is silent 
regarding a patient who 
suffers from depression.   
However, the patient 
must be ‘competent’ to 
make a request.  If 
depression affects the 
patient’s judgment, he or 
she may not be regarded 
as ‘competent’. 
Legislation is silent 
regarding a patient who 
suffers from depression.  
However, patient must be 
‘capable’ to make a 
request.  If depression 
affects the patient’s 
judgment, he or she may 
not be regarded as 
‘capable’. 
Doctor to refer the 
patient for counselling if 
patient may be suffering 
from psychiatric or 
psychological disorder or 
depression causing 
impaired judgment and, if 
does, medication cannot 
be prescribed until 
counsellor determines 
patient is not suffering in 
a way that impairs 
judgment  
Doctor to refer the 
patient for counselling if 
patient may be suffering 
from psychiatric or 
psychological disorder or 
depression causing 
impaired judgment and, if 
does, medication cannot 
be prescribed until 
counsellor determines 
patient is not suffering in 
a way that impairs 
judgment 
 
Oversight of the legislation 
 
Reporting and 
strategic review 
Doctor to notify coroner; 
Coroner advises the 
Attorney-General 
annually of number of 
deaths 
Doctor to notify municipal 
pathologist of action; 
Regional Review 
Committees have overall 
responsibility for 
reviewing notifications 
Doctor completes a form 
for every death and 
registers it with the 
Federal Control and 
Evaluation Commission, 
and form reviewed by 
Commission to ensure 
compliance 
Doctor to submit 
documentation for every 
death to National 
Commission for Control 
and Assessment,  and 
documentation reviewed 
to ensure compliance 
Health care provider who 
dispenses medication to 
file a copy of dispensing 
record with the 
Department of Human 
Services; Department to 
review a sample of 
records annually; 
Department also to 
produce publicly available 
annual statistical report 
Health care provider who 
writes a prescription or 
dispenses medication to 
file documentation with 
Department of Health; 
Department to review all 
records annually; 
Department also to 
produce publicly available 
annual statistical report 
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Appendix C 
 
A framework for considering regulatory options for VE and AS 
 
Arguments for VE/AS Arguments against VE/AS Empirical evidence Functions of criminal law 
Should VE and/or AS be criminal acts? 
YES NO 
Should the criminal law be kept the same? 
Or should it treat this conduct more or less seriously? 
 
What conduct should be permitted and regulated? 
Sentencing 
reform 
Law retained 
Context specific 
offences 
Statutory 
framework to 
regulate 
practice 
Defence to 
criminal law 
prosecution 
Invalidity of laws 
prohibiting VE 
and AS 
Prosecutorial 
guidelines 
LAW REFORM OPTIONS 
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